Islam, it was in fact implementing the concrete policy of a rational secular programme. In the course of the applying this programme the Ottomans often had recourse to invented traditions. In the following pages I attempt, first, to provide a background to the increasing preoccupation of the Ottomans with their public image and, second, to focus on specific policies of the Hamidian era which illustrate the Ottoman version of official nationalism.
THE BACKGROUND TO THE OTTOMAN INVENTION OF TRADITION AS PUBLIC IMAGE: SYMBOLISM AND ITS USES (1808-1908)
As nineteenth-century imperialism reached its peak, the Ottoman state, the only non-Christian Great Power in Europe, began to feel constant pressure to stake its claim in the world arena. The Ottomans were aware to the point of self-consciousness that they were the "only major empire of the pre-moder Islamic world to survive with institutional continuity and a degree of sovereignty into the era of modernization."'4 Yet, their very uniqueness meant that their sovereignty had to be constantly reconfirmed as being based in tradition. Although the empire had always stressed tradition, the nineteenthcentury context demanded its modernization or even its invention.
The contributors to the volume, The Invention of Tradition, draw attention in several instances to the great increase of "neo-traditions" in the nineteenth century.
15 They point to the increased effort expended by the great powers to appear more imperial and more majestic through elaborate ceremonial and the additional pomp and circumstance of the state. Although ceremony had never been lacking in the Ottoman context from the time of Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) through the Tanzimat (1839-76) and afterwards, there was a clear desire to keep up with the Romanovs as the Ottoman ruling house tried to hold its own in the increasingly competitive augmentation of ceremonial throughout the world. 16 One of the most notable symbols of the renewed emphasis on royal power and ceremonial in the late nineteenth century was heraldry. The Sublime State (Devlet-i Aliyye) was symbolized by the coat of arms of the House of Osman (Arma-i Osmani). The design had been commissioned from an Italian artist by Mahmud II. By the time Abdulhamid II came to sit on the Ottoman throne (r. , it was such a well-established part of Ottoman official tradition that when the sultan asked for a detailed description of its contents in 1905, the bureaucracy was momentarily embarrassed because no official authorized version seemed to be readily available. Finally, it was dug up, and the contents described.17 In a detailed memorandum the sultan was informed that the Ottoman coat of arms consisted of both old and new, Turkish and Islamic motifs, such as armaments and other symbolic objects. The central motif in the shield was "the exalted crown of the Sultans," topped by the seal or tugra of the regnant ruler. This was flanked by two heavy tomes, one symbolizing the Islamic law, 5eriat, and the other modem law codes (ahkam-i 5er'iyye ve Nizamiye'yi cami kitab). Under these appeared a set of scales representing justice. The central motif was surrounded and flanked by symbolic armaments, the old balancing the new: an arrow and quiver and an infantry rifle and bayonet, an old-style muzzleloading cannon and a modem field artillery piece, a traditional scimitar and a modem cavalry saber, and so forth. The coat of arms also included traditional Islamic-Ottoman symbols, such as a vase full of blossoming roses and incense, which represented the magnanimity of the state. The total design was flanked on the right side by a cluster of red banners and on the left by a cluster of green banners symbolizing the SultanicOttoman and the universal Islamic nature of the Caliphate. Set under the entire design were the whole array of Ottoman decorations. The central themes of the Ottoman coat of arms revolved around the continuity of the old and the new, the traditional and the modem; yet, it was an invented tradition stemming from the need the Ottomans felt to emphasize that they were a great power like all the others. The fact that the Imperial coat of arms bristled with weaponry is of course indicative of the actual weakness of the state relative to its peers.18 The symbol of the Ottoman Empire can therefore be seen to represent "the use of ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes."19 It was also a very succinct expression of the Ottoman state's "myth-symbol complex."20 Just as the Ottomans tried to emphasize pre-existing traditions by including them in the symbol of the state, they also attempted to curtail the circulation of what were considered "rival symbols." Correspondence between the Chancery of the Grand Vizier and the Palace dated 8 June 1892 dealt with the issue of the importation of goods whose packaging bore the coat of arms of rival powers. The sultan wanted to forbid the entry of such packages, but the Grand Vizier had to point out that there was no legal way for the Ottoman customs to keep them out.21 The visual confirmation of sovereignty was also extended to non-Muslim places of worship. On 24 October 1885, the Grand Vizier Kamil Pa?a reported that the Armenian Catholic church in Biytikdere, a village on the Bosphorus on the outskirts of Istanbul, had erected a commemorative plaque stating that the church had been constructed "during the just and glorious reign of Abdulhamid II." The initiative seems to have come from the Armenian Archbishop, who declared that "this was being done for the first time in a Christian temple." In fact the sultan was rather unsure about how appropriate this whole business was and ordered that "it be secretly investigated as to what the exact wording on the plaque consisted of," too prominent a display "might be offensive to Muslim opinion." Kamil Papa reported back that it was a harmless display of loyalty and in any case the plaque was displayed in an inner courtyard, where few Muslim eyes would see it.22
Abdiilhamid apparently soon overcame his shyness, and the erection of official iconography on non-Muslim official buildings became commonplace. An order dated 16 March 1894 declared that the request of the Catholic Archbishop of Uskiib (Scopje) to display a plaque bearing the Imperial monogram, the tugra, on the Archbishop's residence was to be granted. The decision was based on the precedent that "various Archbishoprics of other confessions have in the past been thus honoured with the August Symbol."23 Official coats of arms and decorations were ubiquitous in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman state was as preoccupied with them as the rest of the world. On 20 June 1892, the Vilayet of Konya reported that certain Greek notables in the town of Isparta had been wearing their official decorations and uniforms to church during the Easter service. The Governor proudly reported that he had put a stop to "this inappropriate practice." He was (no doubt much to his surprise) promptly reprimanded and told that "these people are wearing their decorations as a gesture of pride and loyalty and should not be interfered Rose Chamber, (Hat-i Serif-i Giilhane). Even while setting out the reasons for the new laws, the declaration based itself quite deliberately on religious dogma, stating that "it is evident that countries not governed by the laws of the 5eriat cannot prevail."35 Yet, what it decreed was very much against the 5eriat, that is, the legal equality of Muslim and non-Muslim. In the same vein, the document declared that tax assessment and collection would be carried out according to rational methods, on an equitable basis. This appeal to modernity was, however, couched in the language of the classic Islamic image of the "Circle of Equity": Just laws make for prosperous subjects, prosperous subjects pay their taxes, taxes pay for soldiers, soldiers protect the taxpayers, and so on.36 Thus, although it heralded nothing less than the beginnings of a moder secular state, the language used was that of Islamand with good reason. The measure of legal equality was clearly unpopular among Muslim subjects, who felt that their assured place of superiority in the empire was lost.37
In some ways what Abdiilhamid II felt was this very pulse of "despondency" among his Muslim subjects: The old Sultan had certainly a difficult problem to face in the earlier years of his reign. A physical manifestation of this change towards a moder public persona of the monarch was seen in mosque architecture in the nineteenth century. The classical Ottoman mosque was altered to suit the ceremonial protocol of European usage, so an additional two-story structure was added to the main building to serve as "ceremonial public space," giving a more "worldly" character to the buildings.41 He continued many of the dominant trends of the Tanzimat period, most noticeably the emphasis on centralization and the spread of education.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE STATE IN THE HAMIDIAN PERIOD; IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
The underlying motive force behind all these considerations was that the Ottoman Empire felt threatened both morally and physically. The Sublime State saw that it was constantly losing manoeuvering space in a ever-shrinking world. Just as it was attempting to improve its public image both towards its own subjects and towards the outside world, the challenges mounted. Perhaps the most dangerous of these challenges was missionary activity. The Ottomans realized very early that there was an organic link between nineteenthcentury imperialism and missionary zeal. Everywhere the missionary appeared as the representative of a superior civilization and culture, the primary vehicle for the realization of the White Man's Burden. Not only did the missionaries undermine the efforts the Ottomans were making to legitimize the basis of their rule at home, but they also proved influential in creating adverse conditions for the Ottomans abroad by feeding the Western press with anti-Ottoman sentiment: "Many missionaries and western journalists proceeded upon the confident assumption that the Terrible Turk belonged to a retrograde race of Devil worshippers."43
Particularly in the reign of Abdulhamid II, missionary activity picked up momentum during the 1880s and 1890s, with British, French, Russian, and American missionaries parcelling out spheres of activity within the empire. This led to a situation where, as Jeremy Salt argues, "the relationship that developed between the missionaries and the Ottoman government was one of mutual suspicion and mutual dislike."44 Indeed, by the 1880s the Sultan came to regard the missionaries as "the most dangerous enemies to the social order" among all the foreigners living in his domains.45 Diplomats, merchants, soldiers, all had to do with the here and now; the missionaries, through their schools, had to do with the future. In this respect the missionary issue, far too complicated to be dealt with exhaustively in this study, forms one of the key issues for understanding what was becoming increasingly an Ottoman obsession with their public image.
There is ample evidence, in the Ottoman archival sources, that the Ottoman ruling elite feared infiltration, not only of its Christian minorities but also of its Muslim population, as well as other marginal groups, such as the Nusayris and the Yezidi Kurds. Moreover, it was precisely these marginal elements which were coming to the fore as the state felt that it had to squeeze the last sources for untapped manpower. The implication was, however, that the activity of the missionaries was also having its effect on the Muslim population. Osman Nuri Pa?a suggested that in order for these latter to be preserved from the "intrigues and subversion" of the "priests," and as the holy month of Ramadan was approaching, specially appointed 'ulama should be sent to the areas in question. These teachers were to "secretly impart to the Muslim population the ills that will accrue to them if they sent their children to Christian schools." The appropriate Irade was in fact issued on 1 March 1892 determining that seven local 'ulama should be assigned to the districts in question.54 The interesting aspect of this communinication was its emphasis on secrecy. It is fairly clear that any opposition to the missionaries which was too blatant would draw the wrath of the Powers' consuls.
The Ottomans were clearly aware that the extreme constraints on their resources were creating a vacuum in the educational services being filled by the missionary schools. An Imperial decree dated 26 June 1892 ordered that Muslim children should be removed from all non-Muslim schools and edu- espoused Islam and that she had no regrets about having done so. The couple had taken refuge with the Ottoman Consul in Savucbulak, an Armenian named Toma Efendi. The matter caused no end of complications after the girl's family, the British government, the Iranian government, as well as the local population became involved. Although the documentary evidence is incomplete and fragmented, the matter was clearly much more of an embarrassment rather than a religious triumph for the Porte.65
In all the cases mentioned above, the emphasis is on conversion according to "proper channels" and a positive discouragement of conversion through arbitrary, irregular, or accidental occurrences. The new emphasis on Hanefi orthodoxy also ran counter to the official line of the Tanzimat Edict, which declared that all religions in the empire were equal. A document dated 4 November 1891 refers to a petition sent by ten signatories from Antakya (Antioch), who complained bitterly that although they wanted to become Muslim, the officials in Antioch had "denied them this blessing." The decree issuing on this information ordered that "because there is freedom of religion" (edyan serbest oldugundan), an inquiry should be launched to discover what confession the petitioners belonged to and all procedures relating to them should conform to long-prevailing practices (usul) and regulation (nizam).66 When the Western powers criticized the efforts to prevent proselytizing, the Ottoman officials answered that all religions were equal and everyone had the right to believe what they wanted, but this also meant that they had the right to protect their religion.67
The other remarkable feature of this period is the growing awareness among the ruling circles that new methods were needed to suit this new orthodoxy. A striking example of this new mentality can be observed in a memorandum of 8 April 1892 written by Stileyman Htisnii Pa?a, a leading figure in the deposition of Sultan Abdiilaziz in 1876. In this extremely long and detailed piece, Suleyman Hiisnu Pa?a, exiled as Governor to Bagdad, wrote the sultan, to propose measures for countering both Islamic heresy and Christian missionary activity. The report stressed that those adhering to the "official religion of the state" were actually a minority in the provinces of Bagdad, Mosul, and Basra. Shi'ism was singled out as the greatest danger, but his report also dealt with other rival "heretical sects" In referring to "non-Ottoman Muslims," the Minister was clearly stating a feeling which runs through this period-that the Caliphate of the House of Osman was in danger-and to a considerable extent the threat emanated from Muslims living under Christian rule who could be manipulated to challenge Ottoman legitimacy. It would be appropriate to recall at this juncture that this document was prepared at approximately the same time that talk of the Arab Caliphate was gaining currency in Western orientalist thought. The reference to "troubled times" and loose talk about Islam are almost certainly reflective of anxiety caused by these stirrings of ominous portent with which the Ottomans were only too familiar.
This led the Porte to try to control the printing and sale of the Qu'ran and other religious texts. The answer was found in making the printing of Qu'rans a state monopoly, maintaining that "politically and religiously it is necessary to keep this affair in the monopoly of the state." The procedure was set up whereby any person wishing to publish an edition of the Qu'ran would first present his manuscript to a Commission for the Inspection of Qu'rans (Tedkiki Mishaf-l Serif Komisyonu) staffed by 'ulama chosen by the 5eyhiilislam's office. The candidate was expected to specify whose hand it had been written in, how many copies he proposed to print, and why he wanted to do this in the first place. This was designed to ensure that there would be no falsification in the sacred text and to catch possible accretions which might be injurious to state interests. If his application was approved, he would then be granted permission to have his manuscript published at the press approved by the state. The reason provided to the press for the state monopoly was that this was necessary in order to "ensure that the Holy Book is handled with due care and respect and not defiled by Christian hands."84 Just as the Ottoman state was becoming more meticulous about the printed word of the holy text, it also became much more fastidious as to whom it regarded as "properly Ottoman." Thus the conception of the Caliphate accordingly became much more political than religious. In order to heighten his profile in the Hicaz, the sultan also made use of modem propaganda that were becoming available to the state. In an Imperial Edict of 2 January 1894, the sultan ordered that the newspapers give extensive coverage to the pious endowments he was supporting in the Hicaz. Hostels and hospitals, for example, were to be clearly stressed as they demonstrated the royal munificence by the Protector of the Holy Places. On one occasion the office of the state censor was severely rebuked for not making sure that the press had given adequate publicity to the sirre alayi, the yearly ceremonial departure of the caravan bearing the sultan's gifts for Mecca and Medina. Evidently the Suiian-Caliph did not feel that he had been given enough headline space.86
The project which was perhaps the most spectacular effort to combine practical benefits with propaganda value was, of course, the Hicaz Railway, which was a Herculean effort to link Aleppo and the Syrian coast with the Holy Cities. Abdiilhamid II made full use of its spiritual aspect. Donations were welcomed from non-Ottoman Muslims (their money was evidently welcome as long as they did not come to stay), and the opening of each successive stage of the railroad was ceremonially publicized: "The opening dates were made to coincide with the sultan's accession anniversary. By this means they gained a symbolic importance and were linked to the ruler personally .... This news was relayed to the Muslims of the world by Ottoman, Indian and Egyptian newspapers. 1893, the Palace decreed that 5,000 gold pieces were to be paid to a certain Francois Pirinyan, evidently an Armenian French subject, who was offering for sale what he claimed was a specimen of calligraphy in the hand of the Caliph Ali. The order stated in somewhat euphemistic language that "although its originality cannot be discerned to any degree of certainty, because it has achieved renown as the calligraphy of the exalted Caliph, its place is in the Imperial Treasury, where all such sacred relics belong."88 What was being said here was, in plain language, that it is probably a fake but buy it all the same because it is thought to be real. The preoccupation of the Ottoman state with what can only be called its public image meant that a prestigious item such as the handwriting of one of the early Islamic leaders, even of dubious authenticity, was deemed desirable as part of an effort to bolster the claim to world Islamic leadership. The importance of "making a good showing," specifically in the Hicaz, the seat of Ottoman legitimacy, received constant emphasis. Particularly embarrassing were complaints from Christian consulates and embassies relating to mistreatment or cheating of their subjects undertaking the Islamic pilgrimage, the haj. A public declaration dated 30 January 1896, sent to the officials in the Hicaz in order that they publicize it among the pilgrims, declared that "the pilgrims both from within and without the Imperial Domains are our honoured guests." In addition to this public statement, the local officials were ordered to ensure that the pilgrims were not cheated over such matters as hiring camels and guides.89 Of course, this was a rather vain hope, given the rapacity of the locals for revenue, which they primarily obtained by fleecing pilgrims.90 The same preoccupation with public image is discernible in a discussion dated 27 April 1890 on whether or not the Sublime State should decorate the French President, Sadi Carot. He had gained the sultan's favour by agreeing to ban a play in Paris deemed injurious to the honour of the Prophet Muhammad.91
In all of these examples, from the property rights in the Hicaz to the question of the decoration of the French President, there is a common thread, the desire to bolster the basis of the state's legitimacy. This was done by the creation or invention of traditions, sometimes enforced by law, in an effort to consolidate a new basis for state solidarity within Ottoman society, while maintaining the public presence of the Ottoman state as a Great Power. 
